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Abstract 
This paper describes the socio-economic adjustment effects exerted by globalization 
(taking as starting points competitive pressure, sectoral shifts, and financial market 
contagion) and discusses their relevance for domestic policy-making. I argue that these 
economic pressures and changes constrain government’s policy choice set to an extent that 
actual government policies are quite freed from any political ideological context. Important 
government tasks in a globalized economy include remedying information asymmetries 
and regulating markets as well as provision of essential goods. 
 
Key words: globalization, trade, domestic policy, deregulation, competition, financial 
markets 
JEL codes:  H41, F15 
 
Acknowledgement 
I thank Lisa Bürgi-Bonanomi and Fitzgerald Temmermann for fruitful discussions. 
 
Note: The March 2012 version extends and substantiates the February 2012 version. 
                                                 
1 Senior Researcher; World Trade Institute, University of Bern, Hallerstrasse 6, 8012 Bern, Tel.: +41 31 631 
3432; University of Oradea, Oradea, Rumania;  e-mail: justina.fischer@wti.org; mail@justinaavfischer.de 
 2
1. Introduction1 
 
A new phenomenon is increasingly getting into the focus of socio-economic research: 
globalization and how it impacts people’s socio-economic lives. As such, international 
trade is not new to mankind – as its history, spanning from the Roman Empire, the middle-
aged Hansa trade organization, to the trans-Alpine and the Sino-European silk trade routes, 
suggests. However, prior to the 19th century, cross-national and cross-regional exchange 
had its physical limits and was often restricted to highly profitable luxury goods: For 
example, trade of firm shares through financial markets was limited to the firms in the 
region close-by, with the financial market’s reach determined by the horse speed of 
messengers traveling on streets that turned into mud in autumn. Also, most goods traded 
were profitable luxury goods consumed by the richer middle and upper classes, e.g. gold, 
wine, silk, salt, spices (one may recall the wine-cloth example in the Ricardo model, where 
British cloth at that time was of the highest quality). However, this picture of rather 
marginal economic international connectedness changed with the dawn of industrialization, 
as technologies for cheap mass production and new transport technologies became 
available, but also through its improvements in contract enforceability and abolishment of 
bridge tolls, import and export taxes. 
 
With the dawn of industrialization rather small-scale international trade ‘turned’ into what 
we may call nowadays ‘globalization’, or the ‘globalized economy’. The new quality of 
this phenomenon is that it affects now not only an aristocratic or wealthy elite but the 
common man, in various dimensions: first, goods traded include now mostly normal goods 
(and its components) that are consumed on a daily basis, ranging from toilet paper to 
yoghurt, aiming at meeting a common man’s demand; second, capital flows now freely 
across countries, seeking the most attractive investment opportunities, open to be taken up 
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by the common man (and their portfolio managers). Globalization also affects the common 
man not only in his/her role as consumer and investor, but also as worker, as the opening-
up of the domestic market to foreign imports pressures his/her employer to stay 
competitive – and this not only in a specific, small export sector, but in all economic 
sectors that are directly or indirectly exposed to foreign supply and demand. Finally, the 
common man in his/her role as laborer may decide herself to go migrate to the best-paid 
job, transgressing borders between states. Economic globalization as such is a dynamic 
process that transforms the structure of the domestic economy, and once it has gained a 
certain momentum, it continuously accelerates and becomes unstoppable. In such 
globalized economy, development prospects of the domestic economy increasingly depend 
on international trade and capital markets, and, thus, at a large scale, so does the well-being 
of the common man.   
 
This paper asks the question whether the turning of the national economy into a globalized 
economy has an effect on governments’ choice set of feasible policies. The underlying idea 
is that as a country globalizes, its economic development becomes more and more 
determined by exterior economic drivers, and lesser and lesser by internal processes; 
globalization forces the domestic economy to stay competitive, to deregulate markets, to 
lower government spending and tax levels, triggering brutal and unavoidable structural 
changes, causing much collateral economic ‘damage’ such as sectoral unemployment and 
increasing income inequality. In addition, stronger financial linkages across countries make 
the single country more vulnerable to developments in their trading partners’ economies. 
In consequence, governments loose their discretionary decision-making power and 
influence over the domestic economy. This paper draws this conclusion by presenting 
classical and modern models of trade and providing illustrative examples of sectoral 
structural changes; the innovative contribution lies in discussing these otherwise quite 
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known predictions and developments from a new angle - that is from the viewpoint of 
domestic governments’ policy choices. It concludes with a discussion of which tasks 
remain to national governments in a globalized economy: combating welfare-lowering 
(side) effects of globalization, e.g. through smoothing transformation processes, remedying 
information asymmetries (in the financial sector), imposing externality-correcting 
instruments on imported goods produced under violation of workers’ or human rights, and 
public provision of, or control over, essential goods such as water, electricity, 
infrastructure, and food.  
 
 
2. The impact of globalization on the domestic economy 
 
Economic globalization, as described in the introduction, is the increasing integration of a 
country into the world markets for goods, capital and labor. Domestically, such increasing 
exposure to international markets manifests in rising volumes of exported and imported 
goods and services, as well as increasing outflows of domestic savings into foreign 
investment projects, and increasing inflows of foreign capital into domestic companies. 
With today’s modern means of transportation and English as established ‘lingua franca’, 
economic globalization is also reflected in an increasing mobility of labor across countries, 
skilled and unskilled likewise.2 Economic globalization also manifests in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (such as in the re-location of entire production facilities into foreign 
countries), in joint ventures between domestic and foreign companies (inducing knowledge 
transfer across countries), and in services provided from ‘abroad’ for domestic companies 
and vice versa. Overall, economic globalization is a multidimensional dynamic process of 
integrating one country into the world economy that, once it has gained a certain 
momentum, continuously accelerates and becomes unstoppable (see, e.g., Proudman and 
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Redding, 2000, for a dynamic model). The following sections discuss the socio-economic 
effects of globalization with a special focus on competitive pressure, on sectoral-structural 
changes, on financial international interdependencies, and how these processes generate 
strictly binding constraints for domestic policy choices.  
 
 
2.1. Globalization pressures domestic economy to be efficient 
The process of globalization forces the domestic economy to stay competitive; this has, 
from government’s point of view, the disadvantage of restraining her policy choice set and, 
thus, limiting her discretionary power over the country. For example, integration of the 
domestic economy into world goods and capital markets forces local producers to increase 
their efficiency in production and to produce at competitive costs, in order to remain 
attractive for (foreign) investors and (foreign) consumers (similarly, Garett 1995); 
consequently, as economic globalization increases, domestic firms may lobby for a 
deregulation of national labor markets. Domestic firms under pressure may also demand 
lower taxes and social security contributions, which both make the production factor labor 
more costly, thus lowering their international competitiveness (see similarly, Blank and 
Freeman, 1994). Indeed, the model by Cai and Treisman, (2005) predicts that, under 
capital mobility, countries with an initially rich endowment in one production factor will 
have, in equilibrium, generated an attractive business environment with low tax levels and 
less government spending. In turn, a shrinking tax base, however, exerts pressure on 
governments to reduce their absolute and relative spending levels (Garett and Mitchell, 
2001; Hines and Summers, 2009). This welfare spending restraining effect is often referred 
to as the ‘disciplining effect’ of economic globalization (e.g. Garett, 1995). On the 
empirical side, Garett and Mitchell (2001) report a restraining impact of trade openness on 
government spending, while Plümper et al. (2005) show analogous effects exerted by the 
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amount of low-wage imports (for budget compositional effects, see, e.g., Garrett, 1995).3 
In support of the labor-market related predictions, the accounts in Lindert and Williamson 
(2001) suggest that increasing trade openness is often accompanied by domestic market 
liberalization and a decreasing generosity of the welfare state. Similarly, Fischer and 
Somogyi (2011) and Dreher and Gaston (2007) have shown that over the last 20 years in 
OECD countries economic globalization has lead to a decrease in worker’s employment 
protection and union density.4 Taken altogether, in order to stay competitive in a 
globalized world, governments are under pressure to deregulate labor markets, to liberalize 
capital markets and, ultimately, to lower taxes and government spending. Most importantly 
for my argumentation, such economic pressures persist irrespective of the political 
ideology of the national party that is currently in power (e.g. Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; 
Qian and Roland, 1998).    
 
 
2.2. Globalization induces structural changes across economic sectors 
Another example for how the domestic politics looses discretionary power over the 
domestic economy are the unavoidable long-run effects of economic globalization on the 
relative size of the sectors in an economy, the employment prospects of low-skilled and 
high-skilled workers, and the consequences for income distribution. According to the 
standard model of trade (e.g. Krugman and Obstfeld, 2011), integration into the world 
economy causes a country to specialize in the economic sector the country has a 
comparative advantage relative to the world market (e.g. through a relative or absolute 
abundance of a certain production factor). In OECD countries, such specialization will be 
rather in the industrial than in the agricultural sector, rather in high-skilled than in low-
skilled labor production, and rather in capital-intensive than in labor-intensive industries. 
Classical trade models which assume full employment predict then overall income 
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inequality to increase as the immobile, sector-specific factor in the exporting sector gains 
from trade, while its sector-specific counterpart in the other sector loses (Ricardo-Viner 
model); applied to OECD countries, high-skilled labor would experience wage increases, 
while wage of the low-skilled would fall. This development is acerbated by productivity 
growth through learning-by-doing effects in the exporting sector (Proudman and Redding, 
2000).5 In consequence, at the sectoral level, forces of globalization will attract production 
factors into those sectors and industries the domestic economy specializes in, while, on the 
other hand, setting free production factors in the economic sectors that are then destined to 
contract. This structural change is aggravated through international capital flows and FDI, 
transferring more efficient technologies from abroad into exporting local firms (Bernstein, 
2000; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Mohnen, 2001; van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg, 2001), 
forcing inefficient competitors out of the domestic market (Haddad and Harrison, 1993). 
Also the classical Rybczynski–theorem predicts capital inflows to acerbate this 
development: under fixed goods prices a rise in factor endowment should increase the 
output overproportionally of that economic sector that uses this factor intensively – leading 
to (further) (relative) specialization in that sector and shrinkage of the other. Thus, for 
OECD countries one may expect an inflow of capital that increases the production of 
capital-intensive goods, ultimately contributing to further contraction of the labor-intensive 
production.  
 
With labor market rigidities, dislocations caused by such structural changes may include 
increased job turnover and short-run structural or frictional unemployment (for a model, 
see, e.g., Bernard et al., 2007). Assuming a two-factor two-good Heckscher-Ohlin model 
with capital and labor but allowing for unemployment, Davidson et al. (1999) predict 
unemployment to rise in the sector that uses labor intensively but does not export – caused 
by the endogenous sector-specifity of labor resulting from matching and searching costs. 
 8
Supporting empirical evidence for the unemployment-increasing effect of trade 
liberalization can be found in, e.g., Trefler (2004) for the case of the NAFTA.6 In 
developed countries, specialization in the high-technology industry with high-skilled labor 
may then lead to mass dismissals of unskilled workers in the low-technology industry, 
exerting pressure on their wages. Krugman (1995) has shown that in the US with flexible 
labor markets wages for low-skilled workers (possibly employed in the contracting 
economic sector) have declined, while in Europe instead, with more rigid labor markets, 
unemployment of low-skilled workers has risen.  
 
That globalization increases income disparities between workers and capital owners is 
concluded by, e.g., ten Raa and Mohnen (2008) who suggest that international competition 
in goods markets drives down rents on labor, while (positive) rent levels on capital persist 
for future R&D investments. Already the classical Rybczynski–theorem predicts that in 
developed countries international trade leads to higher rents for capital and high-skilled 
labor than for other production factors.7 Applying tax competition models to an 
international context, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) conclude that under strong economic 
globalization, in developed countries with their larger capital endowments tax levels are 
lowered, implying less means for redistribution and a more skewed income distribution, 
when compared to developing countries that are abundant in labor. In general, economists 
hypothesize that globalization most possibly forces governments to tax bases that are least 
responsive to the forces of worldwide competition – implying that those production factors 
are taxed higher that are relatively less mobile than the other ones, such as immobile labor 
in classical trade models (Garett, 1995; see Bretschger and Hettich, 2002, for empirical 
evidence). Indeed, taxation of labor (wages) is rather observed in populous countries, while 
in small countries with higher international labor mobility rather goods, services, and 
imports are taxed (Hines and Summers, 2009) - reducing overall fiscal progressivity. Many 
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other modern trade theories equally predict a more skewed income distribution, e.g., Egger 
and Kreickmeier (2009), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), and Gaston and Nelson (2002). That 
economic globalization causes particularly wage disparities in OECD countries to grow 
has been empirically shown by Wood (1994), Burtless (1995), Dollar (2002), Dreher and 
Gaston (2008), while the confirmatory study by Smeeding (2002) uses a micro-level 
approach.8  
 
Empirical evidence on sector shifts 
While there is ample empirical research on the linkages between international trade and 
income inequality and unemployment (see above), the evidence on the impact of 
globalization on sector shifts in the economy merits a separate in-depth investigation. That 
the forces of economic globalization cause structural changes in the involved economies 
can be concluded from country-sector-specific developments of (relative) export shares 
and employment patterns.9 Proudman and Redding (2000) show such industrial 
development patterns for the G-5 economies between 1970 and 1993: For example, export 
shares indicate a shrinkage and, thus, loss in comparative advantage in the motor vehicle 
industry in France and the USA, the computer sector in Germany, the metal production in 
Great Britain, and the textile industry in Japan. In contrast, specialization occurred in the 
communication industry in the U.K., in the paper and printing industry in the U.S., in the 
aerospace industry in France, and in the motor vehicle industry in Japan. In general, since 
the 50ies Middle and Southern Europe experienced the closing down of footwear and cloth 
manufactures. Since the nineties the same occurred in post-communist Eastern Europe (see 
ILO, 1996); for example, in Latvia between 1990 and 2008 the shoe pair production shrank 
from some 20 million pairs (1996: 2,2 millions) to some mere 156’000 pairs.10 In the same 
geographic region, this development was paralleled by the shrinking of the agricultural 
sector (as % of GDP), resulting in a growing dependence on agricultural imports from 
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mainly developing countries.11 In consequence, unemployment in these shrinking sectors 
increased. For example, between 1980 and 1993 employment in the textile, clothing, and 
footwear industries declined by 40% in Germany, by 35% in Spain, by 51% in Poland, and 
by 30% in the USA (see ILO, 1996).12 Prominent present-time examples of sectoral 
changes include the phasing out of subsidizing the coal and mining sectors as well as parts 
of the automotive sector, where the pressure to do so increased substantially through the 
fall of the iron curtain and the emergence of the automobile sector in the South-East Asian 
countries. From 1985 to 2007, employment in British mines fell from 220’000 workers to 
7’000 workers (Germany: 607’000 workers in 1957, then 166’000 in 1985, and 35’000 in 
2007); main coal producer is now China.13 In the automobile sector, between 1997 and 
2005 the contribution of the automotive industry to GDP has substantially fallen in France, 
Great Britain, Italy, and Spain (with the exception of Germany which specialized in high-
end products), while at the same time the car production has tripled in India and 
quadrupled in China (see Holweg et al., 2009).  
 
Since the driving factors of these sectoral shifts are structural ones, namely the loss in 
comparative advantage in specific industries, subsidizing the production in such 
‘endangered’ industries may reduce the speed of this adjustment process and appease the 
workers in the shrinking sectors. In the long-run, however, as globalization increases, 
subsidies will cause greater economic inefficiencies and welfare losses, ultimately 
becoming so large that budgetary and efficiency concerns will force governments to put 
this policy to an end. Notably, in Germany the decision in 2007 to cease subsidizing the 
coal mining sector was made by a left-right pro-worker coalition government – being an 
illustrative example that globalization leads to economic necessities that supersede political 
ideology.14  
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Taken altogether, globalization exerts pressures on economic sectors with a comparative 
disadvantage, making them contract and letting entire industries disappear; the resulting 
sectoral unemployment and increase in overall income inequality will occur despite 
national government’s efforts to gain control and possibly counteract this process, and 
irrespective of the couleur of the political parties in power.  
 
 
2.3. Globalization leads to dependence on international financial markets 
Finally, economic globalization also manifests in the increasing linkages between foreign 
and domestic financial markets (through economic interdependencies, but also through 
herding contagion via the behavior of internationally acting investors, see Calvo und 
Reinhart, 1996; Dornbusch et al., 2000; Khan and Park, 2009). Thus, globalization is 
predicted to aggravate the impact of a recession or a financial market crash abroad on the 
domestic economy. The higher the degree of a country’s economic integration is, the larger 
the effect of the world economy on the local economy may be; the strongerly interlinked 
national economies all over the world are, the more likely economic ‘domino effects’ are 
to occur (similarly, Hertz 1999).15 Due to the speed of the cross-national transactions in 
milliseconds and the information transparency in financial and capital markets, as 
compared to goods markets, cross-country domino effects are more likely to be transmitted 
first through the financial channels before they start, with some time lag, working through 
the traditional international trade-in-goods-relations (Hernández and Valdés, 2001; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Forbes, 2004).16  
 
Illustrative examples for domino effects are various past- and present-time financial market 
crises, among others, the US stock market crash of October 1987 crisis, the Mexican crisis 
of 1994, the Asian crash of 1997, US-driven crisis of 2008-09, the new economy bubble-
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burst of 1999/2000, and the Eurozone crisis of 2011 (e.g. Kleimeier et al., 2008; Khan and 
Park, 2009; Markwat et al., 2009):17 the 1997 Asian crisis, for instance, started first with a 
currency crisis in Thailand, then spilled over to financial markets in Asian countries of the 
same region – one argues through herding contagion of Western investors, others argue 
with inefficient financial intermediation of moral-hazard-infected ‘finance companies’ and 
market prices of capital and land –; finally, the Thailand crisis spilled-over also to 
developed countries such as the U.S.A and Western Europe (Ito, 2007; Krugman, 1998; 
Radelet and Sachs, 1998). In 2008/09, it was the break-down of the US American market 
for houses, followed by that for mortgages loans, then that for mortgage-backed securities, 
which then triggered first a local US-wide, and then finally a world-wide financial market 
crisis: the sudden collapse in mutual trust between then undercapitalized private and public 
financial intermediaries led to a liquidity crisis worldwide (on the role of trust, see also 
Guiso, 2010).18 In the case of the 2010-11 crisis, the over-accumulation of debts of the 
Greek government of up to 150% of GDP first affected the market for government bonds 
in Greece only, where interest rates started to skyrocket,19 leading to a loss in sovereignty 
over their national budget to the IMF and the EU (Alessi, 2011). Then, via the EURO-
currency-link and ‘wake-up-effects’ (Forbes, 2004)20, the entire Euro-currency area got 
into the focus of international investors’ critical assessments, and interest rates for national 
treasure bonds, particularly strong for the PIGS-countries, increased.21 With the remaining 
Euro countries partly and temporarily bailing out Greece, Portugal, and Ireland22, the debt 
crisis of Greece became a collective one: first, with shrinking credibility and 
creditworthiness of the Greek government spilling over to other PIGS countries 
(‘sovereign debt contagion’), and, then, to the initially unaffected non-PIGS-countries, 
whose growing rescue efforts let their own debt-to-GDP ratios substantially increase (see 
Alessi, 2011, for an analysis of the Eurozone crisis).23 
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There is empirical evidence that financial linkages via international capital markets spill 
over into the real economy. In particular, the financial market crises described above are 
shown to also impact the real economy of countries all around the world – through 
triggering lower growth, causing considerable inflation, in addition to higher 
unemployment and larger government debt (Ito, 2007; Mishkin, 1992).24 For example, “the 
October 1987 crash […] reduced stock prices by over 20% in most developed markets” 
(Markwat, 2009, p.1996), leading to bankruptcies of banks and firms (Krugman, 1998). In 
2008/2009, as a result of the US housing market crisis Irish banks collapsed, which lead to 
a shrinkage of GDP by 10%, and an increase in unemployment by 9 percentage points (e.g. 
Alessi, 2011). Similarly, the Eurozone crisis caused (exogenously imposed) budget cuts by 
the Greek government, letting Greek unemployment rates skyrocket from about 12% to 
18% (September 2011), compared to one year ago, and the youth unemployment rate reach 
46% (September 2011).25 Similarly for the other PIGS-countries, youth unemployment in 
Spain rose from 42.8% to 49.3% (from 10/2010 to 10/2011), and in Portugal from 27% to 
31%, but stayed at 30% in Italy. In other EU countries during the same period, youth 
unemployment was falling, such as in Slovenia and Finland (18% to 12%, and 19% to 
16%, respectively).26 Taken altogether, the argument in these examples is not that in PIGS-
countries globalization forces domestic governments to cut debts against their will (which 
would have become economically necessary anyhow); rather, my argument is that 
globalization exogenously imposes a specific timeline on domestic policy-making, in 
particular a certain speed and roughness in making reforms that might not be in congruence 
with local political preferences. Overall, growing global linkages through financial markets 
let foreign economies and investors gain more and more impact on the local economy, 
taking the country out of the control of local policy-making.  
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3. Globalization restrains policy choices of domestic governments 
 
The discussion so far has revealed that globalization exerts strong pressures on the 
domestic economy to stay competitive and to reduce government spending, that it triggers 
fast and rough sectoral shifts, and that it creates strong international financial 
dependencies. As an inevitable result, these pressures of globalization restrain 
governments’ choice set w.r.t. economic policy-making: Globalization induces structural 
changes that are, in the long-run, unavoidable, possibly creating mass unemployment in 
one economic sector, while leading to economic growth and worker shortage in another 
sector, increasing income inequality within the group of workers, and between workers and 
capital-owners. In addition, in order to stay competitive, globalization also exerts pressure 
to pursue policies of labor market deregulation, to shift the tax burden from capital onto 
less mobile labor and consumption, and to cut government and welfare spending. Finally, 
globalization creates vibrant trade and capital linkages across countries leading to strong 
cross-national economic dependencies and domino effects, with the potential to aggravate 
or even to cause national economic crises. Obviously, globalization makes the local 
economy re-structure - which may be to the benefit of some societal groups (production 
factors), but equally to the disadvantage of others.27  
 
The argument here is not about assessing whether these economic adjustment processes are 
overally ‘good’ or ‘bad’; the argument I develop here is about that these changes and most 
of their socio-economic consequences are not under the control of domestic politics. The 
idea here is that governments may be compelled to carry out policies that are entirely 
‘dictated’ by the forces of economic globalization, that is the needs of producers and 
workers in the domestic exporting sectors (for example, in developed countries, the 
demands of high-skilled laborers) and the demands in the importing markets abroad.  
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Irrespective of the ideology of the ruling party, under the pressures of globalization any 
government may be forced to deregulate labor markets, to cut taxes and welfare spending, 
and to let domestic capital flow freely into more lucrative investment projects abroad. 
Expressed with the words of Garrett (1995, p.670): “From a neoclassical perspective, the 
ability of the left and organized labor to [pursue leftist policies such as to] increase 
government spending, tax capital heavily, and pursue expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies would decrease with exposure to trade and capital mobility”. Nevertheless, I also 
argue that this statement is equally true for certain policies preferred by more conservative-
minded voters: for example, opening up domestic markets forces domestic industries to 
pay competitive wages, reducing the premium on male labor (‘positive discrimination’), 
and to employ only the most productive workers, causing a higher female labor force 
participation (e.g. Becker, 1957/1971); both changes result then in the destruction of the 
traditional role model in society. In addition, already the decision to pursue a policy of 
trade openness constrains both left-wing and right-wing domestic governments likewise, as 
such policy requires macroeconomic stability, in particular a low level of inflation - with 
all its labor-market, dept-related and distributional consequences (Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan, 2002).  
 
Taken altogether, economic globalization imposes an strictly binding economic constraint 
on national government’s discretionary power over domestic politics, forcing her to accept 
exogenously imposed economic adjustment processes and to pursue policies that may not 
be consistent with her (less binding) political ideologies. Consequently, globalization lets 
national governments seemingly lose steering power over the domestic economy.  
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4. Outlook to the future of domestic policy-making 
The previous discussion has provided evidence that the transformation of the domestic 
economy induced by globalization pressures politicians (partly channeled by the lobbying of 
the affected socio-economic groups) to pursue certain policies; these pressures may become 
so strong that their own ideological constraints become less binding. A prominent real-life 
example is that of left-wing pro-worker governments that are forced to deregulate labor 
markets and to relax workers’ employment protection (Fischer and Somogyi, 2011). In the 
short-run, domestic governments may well try to compensate and counteract certain ongoing 
structural changes in the economy; for example, the shrinking of the mining sectors in Europe 
and of the agricultural sector in the US had been combated through subsidies – which kept 
labor costs of production artificially low. We have seen, however, that, in the long-run, such 
counteracting policies cause more inefficiencies than benefits and are, therefore, economically 
not sustainable – in the very end, both left-wing and right-wing governments likewise will 
prefer to put those subsidies to an end. Particularly in the light of limited government budgets, 
opportunity costs of non-sustainable subsides are high, as these financial resources could be 
more wisely invested in public goods for use by the economic sectors with a (potential) 
comparative advantage in the world market. 
 
 
The role of human rationality 
What would a sensible government policy in a globalized economy then be? Where are its 
limits? What governments cannot change is human behavior as such – that is the 
maximization of benefits from economic activities (be it gainful employment or profit-
generating production). Human beings will therefore always seek the most profitable 
investment opportunity, take the cheapest offer (of otherwise homogenous consumption 
goods), choose the job that pays the highest wage. By this rational human behavior, we all 
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contribute to and cause the pressures exerted by globalization: choosing the cheapest 
consumption good induces pressure on producers to cut production costs through dismissal of 
(more costly) older workers, seeking the best investment projects forces firms to lobby for 
lower tax levels and labor market deregulation, taking the job with the highest net wage 
pressures local governments to cut down income taxes and welfare state spending, etc. 
Moreover, young, male investment-bankers’ choice of assets is most possibly also driven by 
their high level of testosterone – which makes them far less risk-averse and less patient 
compared to the average population (Coates and Herbert, 2008, Stanton et al., 2011).28 
Consequently, these also personally competing young men, then turning almost risk-neutral, 
invest in highly volatile assets promising higher returns, and exploit marginal price 
differences between millisecond in stock markets – with the final consequences of 
exaggerated volatility, market destabilization and, possibly, financial crises.29 Taken 
altogether, the mechanisms on which the pressures of globalization arise from are in-built in 
our human nature and cannot be eradicated. 
 
So what is then left as policy for the domestic government? We recognize now that certain 
structural changes triggered by globalization are inescapable and unstoppable – they will 
occur irrespective of domestic governments’ political preferences and generate social and 
financial ‘pain’ for certain socio-economic groups that are now forced to undergo a process of 
adaptation. However, within certain boundaries, governments can channel these changes, 
smooth certain transition processes, and influence the speed of the adaptation of the national 
economy. Thus, national governments in wealthy countries may be able to compensate the 
‘losers’ of this transformation process: for example, they can afford unemployment benefits 
for dismissed workers in the shrinking sector and finance their acquisition of new, now-
wanted skills. Furthermore, government may provide limited subsidies (e.g. tax exemption) to 
start-up enterprises and the founding of new industries in the growing exporting sector. 
 18
Possibly, to some extent government ideology will have an influence on the choice of 
compensation schemes and instruments to smooth this adaptation process in the domestic 
economy.  
 
Globalization, however, does not exempt domestic governments from their traditional role as 
public goods-provider, tax-levier and rule-setting regulator (Blankart, 2003; Musgrave 1959): 
thus, globalization and letting its forces work does NOT imply neo-liberalism in the economy 
as a whole. In general, government intervention in the market economy is needed wherever 
market failures occur. Such classical failures include external effects such as pollution of the 
environment, the underprovision of public goods through private actors (infrastructure, army, 
public education), but also information asymmetries in markets (e.g. of so-called experience 
goods). In contrast to the traditionally closed textbook economy in which consumers and 
producers are located in the same country, remedying market failures may become more 
complex in a globalized economy. For example, foreign goods may be produced with a 
technology that pollutes the environment abroad/worldwide - reducing the production costs 
compared to a (possibly) domestic good that satisfies domestic anti-pollution laws. Classical 
economic theory now predicts rational, selfish local consumers to buy the cheaper, otherwise 
homogeneous foreign product (this prediction may be different if we assume strong other-
regarding preferences, e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)30; consequently, high domestic demand 
for the foreign good causes a level of pollution that is not pareto-optimal abroad/in the world, 
while the environmentally-friendly, but more expensive domestic good faces a market 
demand of zero.31 Without (domestic) government intervention, the more expensive local 
producer leaves the market, while the foreign producer survives, overally increasing 
worldwide pollution (Copeland and Taylor, 1994). 
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4.1. Externalities 
Analogous examples of social and environmental externalities generated abroad in the 
exporting sector hold for goods that are produced with a lower standard as compared to the 
country they are exported to – be it under a low employment protection scheme, child labor, 
under violation of human rights, with discriminatory practices, without a minimum wage, a 
limited to non-existing welfare state, and/or without any type of social or health insurance. All 
these practices serve to artificially lower the costs of (labor-intensive) production and to, from 
the view of the importing country with higher standards, to swamp markets with goods at 
dumping prices (Busse and Spielmann, 2006). Overall, without domestic government 
intervention, so the public’s fear, the inflow of such goods into the domestic market will 
either drive domestic firms into bankruptcy or induce a world-wide race to the bottom in 
terms of labor protection and welfare state generosity (Fischer and Somogyi, 2012; Dreher 
and Gaston, 2007, Sinn, 2001).32  
 
In order to preserve certain social and environmental standards in the importing society, 
domestic governments may choose to intervene in their national goods markets so that foreign 
produce is sold at a price that internalizes the social and environmental externalities under 
which they had been produced abroad. Means for internalizing such labor/environmental 
standard and human rights externalities that occur abroad may include traditional trade policy 
instruments in the importing country applied to specific goods (quotas, tariffs), but also 
traditional externality-correcting public choice instruments such as Pigouvian taxes (Pigou, 
1928) and licenses (as currently applied in international Climate-preserving CO2 reduction 
policies), as well as norm-setting (‘rules of the game’) through international treaties on labor 
standards/human rights in general (e.g. ILO convention).33 In case of environmental damage, 
an alternative instrument to combat pollution is the government-induced transfer of clean 
production technologies (Copeland and Taylor, 1994). Briefly turning to the example of the 
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selfish, young, risk-neutral male traders acting in the financial markets, a small transaction tax 
large enough to neutralize arbitrage gains of course volatility between two milliseconds and 
the prohibition to speculate with assets connected to essential goods (water, food, etc., see 
also section 4.3.) will substantially contribute to calming down of international financial 
markets and prevent future externalities of their economic activities on societies worldwide. 
 
 
4.2. Information asymmetries 
The classical task of governments to regulate markets through providing institutional 
frameworks persists in a globalized economy also with respect to information asymmetry; in 
fact, most of financial crises were partly caused or at least acerbated due to unresolved 
information asymmetry problems about products or the actors who sold them. Similarly, it 
may be difficult for the domestic consumer to assess the quality of a good that has been 
produced abroad under technological and social circumstances unknown to her. In classical 
textbook-models of a closed economy, governments may choose, for example, to introduce 
labels which signal quality, based on tests run by some national, independent public agency. 
In history, some of these agencies have been founded by concerned consumers themselves 
(originally as type of club good), or by national governments, for dissemination of quality 
assessment to the public (as public good). In a globalized economy, particularly with a view 
on the financial market, past history of financial market crashes has revealed the need for such 
independent agencies which assess the quality of financial products or of their sellers (e.g. 
Guiso et al., 2010, on trust information asymmetries across banks). Similarly, for traditional 
consumption and intermediary goods, international agreements on common technical 
standards and quality checks equally serve the purpose of combating information asymmetries 
regarding the foreign import (or its subjection to national testing agencies prior to admission 
to the domestic market). Independence of quality-assessing agencies particularly from the 
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sellers’ side (who have an incentive as rational profit-maximizers to disguise the true (low) 
quality of their products), but also from the government itself (which equally acts as seller on 
good and asses markets), ensures that the information provided to buyers is accurate and 
credible. Thus, combating information asymmetries between sellers and buyers in world 
markets is another classical government task which gains new importance in the era of 
globalization.  
 
 
4.3. Public provision of essential goods 
Finally, globalization also underlines the importance of the classical, ‘public goods’-provision 
task of domestic government: Often, globalization was paralleled by privatization of formerly 
public industries – privatization lowers government spending and forces these newly private 
firms to produce at competitive costs, from which also the common citizen profits, so the 
usual arguments (Stiglitz, 2002). However, privatization shifts the managers’ goal from 
pursuing a purely cost-covering production to running a profit-maximizing enterprise instead 
– consequently, unprofitable branches are simply shut down, leaving some citizens without 
supply. Furthermore, profits generated in one country were often used to finance market 
expansion into other countries – triggering rising prices for citizens at home. In addition, these 
competing formerly public firms, usually of already a large size, have a strong incentive to 
form oligopolies in order to avoid competition and to exploit their joint market power. Recent 
examples include the electricity, train and postal systems, but similar observations are made in 
water supply and grain production. Finally, the products of these newly privatized firms 
became now, like any other good in the world, subject to the speculation of traders, causing a 
high volatility in world market prices – possibly causing suffering and death in developing 
countries (see section 4.1.). In sum, most privatization policies in Europe and other parts of 
the world appear to have failed: these privatized firms generated highly concentrated national 
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or regional markets, with prices for consumers often having quadrupled ten years after 
privatization (e.g. Stiglitz, 2002). Obviously, while, in general, globalization creates 
competitive pressure through granting access across national markets, it does not so in most 
parts of the formerly public sector.34 Thus, the classical government task to organize and 
control the supply of essential goods such as water, electricity, infrastructure and staple food 
remains and grows in importance in a globalized economy. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper uses predictions of theoretical models of trade and empirical evidence thereof to 
build an argument that economic globalization triggers unavoidable economic consequences 
and adjustment processes for the domestic economy. Moreover, I argue that, going beyond a 
purely ‘disciplining effect’ (Cai and Treisman, 2005), globalization constrains governments’ 
policy choice set in general, possibly to an extent that actual policy choices are mainly 
ideology-free, rather being driven by the demands and needs of investors and domestic 
producers in the highly-profitable exporting sector. However, I also highlight the policy 
challenges that persist - mainly the classical government tasks of regulating the economy in 
the presence of market failures (externalities, information asymmetries, public goods, see 
Musgrave 1959), arguing that these classical tasks become even more imperative as countries 
start globalizing.  
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1 Parts of this article are based on the working paper “Globalization and Political Trust”, NCCR Working Paper 
No. 2012/05.   
2 In traditional theories of trade, the production factor labor is assumed to be immobile, while capital is assumed 
to move easily across countries (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2011).  
3 In general, the literature has not reached consensus on how globalization affects government spending. It may 
well be argued, and some empirical evidence points in that direction, that governments redistribute more to 
certain groups or protect some groups stronger than others as its economies globalize, possibly to appease the 
losers from this development or simply because of their lobbying power (Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Fischer 
and Somogyi, 2011; Garrett 1995, 1998; Hicks and Swank, 1992; Huber and Stephens, 1998; Rodrik, 1998). In 
contrast, Dreher, Sturm, and Ursprung (2008) and Dreher (2006) do not find globalization to affect government 
or social spending.  
4 See Schulze and Ursprung (1999) for a review of the early literature on the effect of globalization on social and 
welfare spending. 
5 In principle, technological spill-overs across countries could cause a reversal of the current patterns of 
specialization, in case they more-than-neutralize the sector-size dependent learning effect.  
6 Felbermayer, Prat, and Schmerer (2011) show empirically that, at least in OECD countries, in the long-run 
increased openness reduces unemployment. This finding contradicts textbook predictions that trade openness had 
no long-run effect on unemployment; Krugman (1993, p.25) states: “Trade policy should be debated in terms of 
its impact on efficiency, not in terms of phony numbers about jobs created or lost.” However, some modern trade 
theories predict an increase in long-run unemployment, possibly through frictional unemployment, minimum 
wage, or segmented labor markets (as in developing countries) (e.g. Baghwati and Srinivasan, 2002; Brecher, 
1974; Davis, 1998; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010).   
7 See Burtless (1995) for an in-depth discussion of labor market models with free trade to explain increasing 
wage inequality.  
8 Implicit evidence for growing wage inequality can be drawn from Blanchflower et al. (1996) who show that 
wages grow overportionally as profitability of firms rise. The empirical evidence on income disparities in place 
of wage disparities is more ambiguous (e.g., Dollar, 2002; Dreher and Gaston, 2006).  
9 The literature employs the revealed comparative advantage index which is based on sector-specific export 
shares. For a description, see Balassa (1965) and Vollrath (1991). 
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10 Source: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/11/articles/lv0911029i.htm (download: 28th December 
2011) 
11 This may exclude very specialized industries producing high quality products, possibly luxury goods, e.g. high 
quality clothing and textiles, or high quality processed farm products, such as premium olive oil (see, e.g. 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/economic-sectors/industrial-goods/textiles-and-footwear/, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/economic-sectors/agriculture/, downloaded 26th December 2011).  
12 Notably, this is the view of developed Europe, Japan, and the US. ILO (1996) also states that shifting the 
production to developing countries created jobs in these economies. For example, during the same period, 
sectoral  employment rose by 33% in Turkey and by 85% in China.  
13 Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,463172,00.html (downloaded 26th December 2011). 
14 In 2007, the German subsidies for mining amounted to 2.7 billion Euros. Source: see preceding footnote. 
15 “The domino pattern indicates that global crashes, which can hardly be diversified, do not occur abruptly but 
rather evolve out of prior local or regional crashes” (Markwat et al., 2009, p.1997). 
16 Forbes (2004) proves the existence of the trade channel by showing that exporting firms are hit stronger by 
international financial crises than firms producing for the domestic market. Focusing exclusively on the 
occurrence of currency crises, Haile and Pozo (2008) find a dominance of international trade linkages over 
having common lenders. 
17 Lazear (2011) views the 2008/09 and the 2011 crises as ‘popcorn effects’ rather than ‘domino effects’. Edison 
et al. (1998) present a theoretical model explaining the domino effect in the 1998 Asian financial market crisis. 
See Kahn and Park (2009) for more empirical literature on contagion effects between 1987 and 2009. The 
Mexican crisis spilled over so far that the IMF provided financial assistance also to neighboring Latin American 
countries (Ito, 2007).  
18 For a comprehensive summary, see e.g. http://cashmoneylife.com/economic-financial-crisis-2008-causes/ (28th 
December 2011). Spill-over to European banks occurred because they had bought large bulks of those mortgage 
backed securities, often after decennials of fighting against national bank regulation laws that restricted 
investment in risky (but potentially more profitable) business. 
19 The Maastricht criteria allow a maximum of 60% of GDP only. 
20 A ‘wake-up-effect’ lets investors check the creditworthiness of countries with characteristics similar to the 
country first in financial difficulties, in this case Greece (see Forbes, 2004). 
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21 The lowering of the PIGS-countries ratings of creditworthiness is a rational consequence of their governments’ 
imprudent economic policy making, on the one hand, but also partly because of the many ‚old’ government debts 
originating from the US mortgage market crises in 2008-09. 
22 According to Alessi (2011) Greece received a $163 billion loan in May 2011 and a second bailout package 
(that included a haircut) worth $178 billion.  
23 Davis and Stone (2004) provide an enumeration of banking and currency crisis episodes in developing and 
developed countries between the 1970ies and 2000.  
24 Higher inflation as predictor of exchange rate change particularly occurs in emerging economies (Ito, 2007). 
25 As reported by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE), press 
release of 8th December 2011. 
26 Unemployment rates have been obtained from Eurostat 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home) (29th December 2011). 
27 Under strict model assumptions, predicted positive effects of economic globalization include higher overall 
welfare, optimized consumption patters, higher rents of production factors in the exporting sector (e.g. higher 
wages for low-skilled in developing countries), higher levels of general employment, and higher overall growth 
(e.g., Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002; Davidson et al., 1988, 1999; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Felbermayer 
et al., 2011; Mehlum et al., 1996; Krueger, 1983; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2011; Srinivasan and Bhagwati, 2001; 
for supporting empirical evidence, see, e.g., Bhagwati and Srinivasan 2002; Dollar, 2001; Dollar and Kraay 
2004; Felbermayer et al., 2011; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Krueger, 1983). However, many empirical studies 
also reveal strong distributional conflicts and biased within-sector technological progress (Deaton and Dreze, 
2002; Srinivasan and Bhagwati, 2002). 
28 In explanation these effects, Cotates and Herbert (2008) argue that “testosterone […] have receptors 
throughout the brain region identified in neuroeconomic research as contributing to irrational financial 
decisions” (p.6170)), high levels of testosterone were also found to lead to impulsivity and sensation seeking 
(Daitzman and Zuckerman, 1980).  
Brañas-Garza and Rustichini (2011) show experimentally that, in addition, testosterone levels also positively 
correlate with abstract reasoning ability.  
29 The fact that traders and investment bankers also compete on a personal level with each other may cause an 
additional rise in testosterone level, in analogy to what has been widely observed for sports competition (for a 
review, see Booth et al., 2011). 
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30 Other-regarding preferences include forms of altruism and inequality aversion – which may be summarized as 
‘moral or cooperative behavior’ in non-economic social sciences. Economists, in general, expect weight on the 
self-regarding utility component to be larger than that on the other-regarding component.  
31 This is the theoretical prediction and the public fear. The empirical analysis by Antweiler et al (2001) suggests 
that international trade has no effect on the level of pollution worldwide.  
32 In contrast, Dreher et al (2012) find that economic globalization fosters human rights – probably with 
economic growth and national wealth as its transmission channel.  
33 For a discussion on international treaties as means to protect such standards in a trade context, see Bürgi-
Bonamoni (2012).  
34 One reason for the lack of competitive pressure are the market entrance prohibiting sunk costs of production 
(e.g. the electricity grid, trains, water pipes, etc.). 
